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H1
loper os
sage smartprobe gdb command manual.
or you could skip straight to the pill:
H2
still tenser, said the censor.
the care and feeding of the sage smartprobe.
how to make your own lamport parachute from common household materials.
phuctored ssh public keys.
on the matter of brian krebs.
a complete pill for the sage smartprobe.
tears of the phucked.
terraforming the “mycloud mini” : tty.
phuctor is back!
vectored signatures, or the elements of a possible v-algebra.
support this site:
categories
about
collaborations
people
popular posts
sub-projects
toys
vintage
archives
meta
H3
H4
H5
H6
strong
but!
sage smartprobe gdb command manual.
now you must destroy the private key! it shall never be used again!
suicidal.
a snapshot of all phuctored keys at the time of writing can be viewed here, if the main site is slow under load.
a time-limited hardware peripheral!
this article is continued here.
entire set
edit:
b
i
em but!
sage smartprobe gdb command manual.
now you must destroy the private key! it shall never be used again!
suicidal.
a snapshot of all phuctored keys at the time of writing can be viewed here, if the main site is slow under load.
a time-limited hardware peripheral!
this article is continued here.
entire set
edit:
Bolds strong 9
b 0
i 0
em 9
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1 #fn:1
simplicity http://www.loper-os.org/?p=47
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Linki zewnętrzne

loper os

http://www.loper-os.org
home http://www.loper-os.org
about loper os http://www.loper-os.org/?p=8
guiding principles http://www.loper-os.org/?p=284
rss feed http://www.loper-os.org/?feed=rss2
contact http://webchat.freenode.net/?channels=#trilema&nick=fromloper
pgp http://www.loper-os.org/pgp.asc
« previous http://www.loper-os.org/?paged=2
still tenser, said the censor. http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1862
- http://www.loper-os.org/pub/ycombinator_eagerly_eats_nsa_shit.png
stay classy http://www.loper-os.org/?p=91
ycombinator http://trilema.com/2013/ycombinator-continues-to-suck-jointly-and-severally/
chumpatronics http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=47
cryptography http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=45
hot air http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=8
nonloper http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=15
philosophy http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=17
softwaresucks http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=23
2 comments http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1862#comments
the care and feeding of the sage smartprobe. http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1821
if you cured your sage smartprobe of its congenital disease as per the last article on the subject http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1667
gdbinit.txt: http://www.loper-os.org/pub/sage/gdbinit.txt
sage smartprobe gdb command manual. http://www.loper-os.org/pub/sage/sage_smartprobe_gdb_command_manual.html
cold air http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=39
computation http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=4
hardware http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=7
nonloper http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=15
shouldersgiants http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=21
softwarearchaeology http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=43
softwaresucks http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=23
1 comment http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1821#comments
how to make your own lamport parachute from common household materials. http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1762
the thought began http://btcbase.org/log/2016-09-27#1549124
#trilema http://webchat.freenode.net/?channels=#trilema&nick=fromloper
wot http://trilema.com/2014/what-the-wot-is-for-how-it-works-and-how-to-use-it/
v http://cascadianhacker.com/07_v-tronics-101-a-gentle-introduction-to-the-most-serene-republic-of-bitcoins-cryptographically-backed-version-control-system
“cryptographic death” – i.e. the compromise of one’s signing key http://thewhet.net/2012/shall-be-delivered/
but “never say never!” http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/faq
the popular notion of key revocation is a questionable business http://btcbase.org/log-search?q=revocation
attempts to impose a political structure onto an uncooperative mathematical reality http://ansuz.sooke.bc.ca/entry/23
bitcoin blockchain http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1490
is called deedbot, and the reader is invited to become familiar with it. http://deedbot.org/faq.html
may conceivably fall this very night http://www.zdnet.com/article/if-public-key-cryptography-were-really-broken/
l. lamport http://www.lamport.org
1979 “one time signature” algorithm http://www.loper-os.org/pub/lam-par/lamport79.pdf
collision-resistant hash https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/ec98/full_papers/anderson/anderson_html/node14.html
68 http://www.loper-os.org/pub/lam-par/lamport_decode_old.sh
the user is expected to understand each individual part, so that the function of the whole becomes unambiguously apparent, like 2+2. http://btcbase.org/log-search?q=fits+in+head
is slowly reconquered http://trilema.com/2016/btmsr-block-cipher-competition/
schneiers http://trilema.com/2013/why-i-suspect-schneier-is-an-us-agent/
other scumbags http://trilema.com/2016/psa-hanno-bock-still-a-deceitful-shitbag/
randomly-generated http://btcbase.org/log-search?q=rng
lamport_mkpriv.sh http://www.loper-os.org/pub/lam-par/lamport_mkpriv.sh
this will create a parachute private key http://www.loper-os.org/pub/lam-par/privkey.txt
lamport_priv2pub.sh http://www.loper-os.org/pub/lam-par/lamport_priv2pub.sh
now we have the public key. http://www.loper-os.org/pub/lam-par/pubkey.txt
private key may then be destroyed http://trilema.com/2014/spy-stuff/
stegatronically http://btcbase.org/log-search?q=stego
the enemy http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1299
public http://www.loper-os.org/pub/lam-par/another_pubkey.txt
private http://www.loper-os.org/pub/lam-par/another_privkey.txt
lamport_encode.sh http://www.loper-os.org/pub/lam-par/lamport_encode.sh
signature http://www.loper-os.org/pub/lam-par/encoded.txt
lamport_decode.sh http://www.loper-os.org/pub/lam-par/lamport_decode.sh
v-genesis http://trilema.com/2016/the-v-manual-genesis/
here http://www.loper-os.org/pub/lam-par/lam-par-genesis.vpatch
here. http://www.loper-os.org/pub/lam-par/lam-par-genesis.vpatch.asciilifeform.sig
the other kind http://trilema.com/2014/o-hai-let-me-verify-your-identity/
there exists, and can exist, precisely one blockchain. http://trilema.com/2014/the-woes-of-altcoin-or-why-there-is-no-such-thing-as-cryptocurrencies/
liar http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1719
there exist certain questionable schemes to somewhat reduce this bulk https://archive.is/dnrf5
loathesome hucksters http://btcbase.org/log/2016-08-03#1513443
rompel, 1990 http://www.loper-os.org/pub/lam-par/rompel.pdf
popescu's license http://trilema.com/2015/a-new-software-licensing-paradigm/
bitcoin http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=42
cold air http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=39
computation http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=4
cryptography http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=45
friends http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=48
idea http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=9
mathematics http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=34
nonloper http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=15
papers http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=16
philosophy http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=17
shouldersgiants http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=21
softwarearchaeology http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=43
softwaresucks http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=23
uncategorized http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=1
10 comments http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1762#comments
phuctored ssh public keys. http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1733
phuctored ssh public keys to date. http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/faq
phuctor http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com
here http://www.loper-os.org/pub/snap/ph_snap.html
ask questions ! http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/contact

112.16.4.21
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/92ef45902ad5ddd496f233a413911c8a77bf9fab0f6605acc1b305a87c863708

ssh-1.99-comware-5.20
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-1.99-comware-5.20

112.16.65.245
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/4e7ac0eef980d94b18797fd2b95c091c4eac05b15c9fcb329825f05b81b8d903

112.16.65.247
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/21b9669858203080326db86f3ab1b88d51f892d38f17ea587f71640f604ba7ad

112.16.95.66
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/8fc5cf2b4967fcb5a48f3cb895abe79b21364ff6ec46b6fdefb18d47ec998b76

ssh-1.99-rgos_ssh_1.0
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-1.99-rgos_ssh_1.0

177.234.0.97
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/59cf09b5a54c07b13532a929e710a3dc31279d3683f660369be64c0eaf77b7cb

ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5

177.234.11.229
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/ab1cc7c0f992fb8527d4b489d4202eb78672f9e0a7f2908a5a3611a00611cde6

ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5

177.234.13.179
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/fbc53c4fc84fb6570cc9aacee304cf6e13339c4581d517a786c30daba3995874

ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5

177.234.13.241
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/1e3e9002c721814e2c39e9f4bd4b5016523a5add56f7c40a0563637241ce6e09

ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5

177.234.15.27
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/203f16439790f93f40ede8b6ddc2d70a8576c55fdb4e41ecd2480e4db243ab19

177.234.1.73
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/264c89bed70edf1abbd841805c2a3ef1275599c01c8601a53097fe0fe8f4524c

ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5

177.234.1.91
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/225ed2bd4112f1bf529cfb1d4d37a9de03c198284c418ad85364a543bd795aae

ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5

177.234.4.97
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/62a0a5ff9984d126e11550fc9bafe24c40a6b55f885aa428effdf4af59405fc6

ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5

177.234.6.21
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/3f0f2b8c4d3ca8ab2e472f60f174c6c8fee475c87e9b966190c9b8a80c02fc23

ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5

177.234.9.13
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/5f8de075cdbaa6097de1bf6b4ba32a47399b1098244e6e3c83374ba3024df981

ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5

183.246.69.24
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/609af429a536fca467f01f21da23da79c5663b50fcf17243c6af812e8d86e222

ssh-1.99-comware-5.20
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-1.99-comware-5.20

187.188.126.28
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/839abb69349bd78f784309db89d871c3ca284c1ef0e060e1ff3a19beb3882351

187.72.155.221
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/2054966af8f713aea82e57f5abf335459a69f7f4f5c78d872af13a51e058fab5

ssh-2.0-audiocodes
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-audiocodes

187.72.216.78
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/d19454e9b6d21395452944451a4d50c0f7b5eabab90d532fdf62f7a152856a66

ssh-2.0-audiocodes
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-audiocodes

189.112.138.254
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/bf36993206c52161e9b40d730f32c683e7b758528edaafd0b17c3e1b0cce28f5

189.203.181.149
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/f97816e68ffbd245ad39f3509a34b16d8f193d91a6125903354ab4cb383548f3

ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5

189.203.181.7
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/643a139ef044f87f326f313092bde22d60c79a81318babb87ae5c142bc86b939

ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5

189.203.72.147
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/9d60710f34429805ca983e018b19c9d0400e3978c6a4f97721303d362a1e9941

ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5

190.39.56.107
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/a15eace4291de6eafa302572f54e054491218af959463e119a212d1f84ead475

197.221.61.38
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/13e82f824b83584c0cec6d9c2d29b4da59e8a469daf84126a264fdd744b8488d

ssh-2.0-openssh_3.8.1p1 debian-8.sarge.4
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-openssh_3.8.1p1 debian-8.sarge.4

197.221.63.150
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/175a4092f61f9c375817e0752e2accbd43e0abd014580bbf6569ec16b36b6eca

200.146.242.241
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/0648ebdeef3f210d6a081115bd29dc916fcc304d6839a0d142993d704eacb182

ssh-2.0-audiocodes
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-audiocodes

201.101.37.44
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/d3936bc56e8f7703f382a67bd36439486558c5e4a13919f1d522a6373ea83ebd

ssh-2.0-openssh_6.0p1 debian-4+deb7u2
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-openssh_6.0p1 debian-4+deb7u2

201.16.189.38
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/58fa3607665fe6e88fedde7fe0c07f9e56d591ca9431e95899d57a5ba2d51ef3

201.249.207.150
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/cda444b217b93bd108b3681b3e46d2f81dde108a156e84e696789db8d3074a06

ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5

202.166.221.118
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/221218755bb59c166bd88435267638c04f757d5630064ca207d228b4a7520f57

2.116.209.1
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/f7ee9d7418360ebf5222d566b0a5b811023ac29616ebc02a9ee52bdb5a00038a

ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5

217.57.196.177
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/a558b10a1ccc09194358e0502cafa4415f57f1944dd9fe618e2a2e2d29efac0f

ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5

217.57.196.179
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/24698ad72475bb28f25ad63cc626a01ec41af82bc51bc4cb8118fc5b15bdf42e

ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5

223.94.78.217
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/9791cd47ca7c159454ef0ebab5b2cdda613798e4c87012959ada6e8a63949a27

ssh-1.99-comware-5.20
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-1.99-comware-5.20

59.21.182.242
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/9bbdeb5651ad779357cc0300d7eba2b94508bd233c3efce605a33732a425a607

ssh-2.0-openssh_5.9
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-openssh_5.9

66.233.213.117
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/f8011333e293b9f0a5f9be238eee6962f9991f66f3fa36cdc317c0680c02d5af

ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2

68.14.242.210
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/25735c9524851a27c6b6968f1e24b64a6e2d529b5bf16d96f922e1ff96ffedf9

ssh-2.0-openssh_6.6
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-openssh_6.6

71.39.252.162
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/700b8bcb736abb90fbd44cf67f97d08bc607249723dcd55dbc2a7cd36c495d4e

74.45.0.60
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/5c90e36acaf227f40884c95fc6304f9ae04201b80cf895400df9f244788cf79c

ssh-2.0-openssh_4.1
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-openssh_4.1

74.45.228.159
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/986cbe61250486dabcec88d21aebc21e3b49c40f0eb81b86305b3fd41350e0ed

ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2

74.45.228.160
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/bd93382e8b0ce07c1f76acb19483596e3bdb288b5f9c3848b66566790856981a

ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2

74.45.228.49
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/422d344b23210cb546373993313b4c67217fdcd2a5b473af0e3d73110f7d1334

ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2

74.45.228.86
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/8a4251b53531e6f9a0a60e2b75b9256ca8412f7f4fa956f2d46772adb2f890ba

ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2

74.45.228.97
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/d0ac0c30bc34d89a0030fee5cf3b72aad12a5ca8957eae53a26562a2707ac0bd

ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2

74.45.229.217
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/883b06e873c07e5b89d390661892df1b8a06b6026a6bbb63475b2e6002ae1e11

ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2

74.45.231.125
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/bc28a8c915bf048456c5294b50ef4e9d0e032024b46778ff29788cede94d7ea3

ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2

74.45.231.136
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/1065c2ffa619ae534a1ea8853a33ad9a810557bcefc2f45308ee932b59d47bdc

ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2

74.45.231.156
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/ea847d018f26a8b10bd14fa05388a71300d259ecbdf38e97f9f842981695f00e

ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2

78.188.162.184
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/d02c7eb6e3b29fb9d1cd6bc815a0f28c162095115e62cac36d79ad5d587d0910

ssh-2.0-rosssh
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-rosssh

85.14.248.152
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/ee6e84ed0485e5c4615d47e7bf518a35f1a8de60c6dfbbf1f60b1911839726ce

ssh-2.0-openssh_6.0p1 debian-4+deb7u3
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-openssh_6.0p1 debian-4+deb7u3

85.218.41.103
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/c29ea6b1f7d6ad77deba08e41c7c04c88a9c80a2bbda661383959a4dabac776e

ssh-2.0-openssh_5.9
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-openssh_5.9

91.229.251.116
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/50840391e5677882196999c9ae77f3177e6cbf8d35fb4f1fef848cfadf9088b1

ssh-2.0-rosssh
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-rosssh

94.141.150.121
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/674f2eb3301fa29245fea083c0bc505b7b3f7dfd2c80335451217c5cd63ee4f8

ssh-2.0-rosssh
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-rosssh

96.24.7.172
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/7ecdab4f47dc074fd5dd619e8497611c76099101869f1050f59331acb3688182

ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2
http://btcbase.org/log-search?q= ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2
bitcoin http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=42
cold air http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=39
computation http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=4
cryptography http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=45
friends http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=48
mathematics http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=34
nonloper http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=15
philosophy http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=17
softwaresucks http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=23
no comments http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1733#respond
on the matter of brian krebs. http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1719
brian krebs https://archive.is/od6gn
sitting sadly offline https://archive.is/vkrrh
~tb/sec ddos flood. https://archive.is/gqsdd
reason http://cluborlov.blogspot.com/2016/07/the-power-of-nyet.html
gauleiters http://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/gauleiter.htm
shipped, bound and gagged, to american prisons. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-guccifer-iduskcn0wy5mk
forcefeeding https://archive.is/neuyt
artfully sabotaging open source software http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1299
mahmood khadeer bombshell http://qntra.net/2016/08/phuctor-finds-seven-keys-produced-with-null-rng-and-other-curiosities/
discoveries http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/phuctored
krebs was taken under the wing https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/09/the-democratization-of-censorship
google’s “project shield” https://projectshield.withgoogle.com/public/
the internet of the future http://www.loper-os.org/?p=208
schneier http://trilema.com/2013/why-i-suspect-schneier-is-an-us-agent/
no accident. http://trilema.com/2014/heres-why-we-dont-like-how-the-world-currently-works/
who profit handsomely from it. http://btcbase.org/log/2014-02-13#499311
found http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/faq
tip of the birthday theorem iceberg http://btcbase.org/log/2016-09-02#1533642
chumpatronics http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=47
cryptography http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=45
distractions http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=6
hot air http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=8
philosophy http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=17
softwaresucks http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=23
5 comments http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1719#comments
a complete pill for the sage smartprobe. http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1667
amd http://btcbase.org/log-search?q=amd
- http://www.loper-os.org/pub/sage/sage_and_gb.jpg
sage eng. llc, it appears, is long dead. https://web.archive.org/web/20150813213858/http://www.se-eng.com/2015/07/so-long-and-thanks-for-all-the-fish/
coreboot https://www.coreboot.org/
whatever other attempts at sane utilization of x86-64 iron http://btcbase.org/log/2016-09-18#1544581
- http://www.loper-os.org/pub/sage/front_s.jpg
- http://www.loper-os.org/pub/sage/test_points.jpg
openocd http://openocd.org/
this gdb script http://www.loper-os.org/pub/sage/instr_trace.gdb
sage_pill.py
(sha256: 2f9ce44fe069705a7ee83c0f4c733a6a0cc374613429c5c1f47a8481aa464b60)
http://nosuchlabs.com/pub/sage_pill.py
sage_last_public_fw.tar.gz
(sha256: 30c005febfbff531a2b9d06ef8c2c41fedb2c8993a2992a373fbeb66900fbaf8)
http://nosuchlabs.com/pub/sage_last_public_fw.tar.gz
here. http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1821
cold air http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=39
computation http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=4
hardware http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=7
nonloper http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=15
photo http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=37
softwarearchaeology http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=43
no comments http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1667#respond
tears of the phucked. http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1662
- http://www.loper-os.org/pub/hc.jpg
phuctor http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com
april http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1639
a scan of the complete ipv4 space http://btcbase.org/log/2016-06-14#1482779
breaking http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/50840391e5677882196999c9ae77f3177e6cbf8d35fb4f1fef848cfadf9088b1
a ‘websense’ censortron control panel, apparently http://www.websense.com/support/article/kbarticle/how-can-i-get-more-information-about-my-policy-from-the-block-page
a little bit too late http://qntra.net/2016/04/phuctor-the-rsa-super-collider-discovers-vulnerability-in-northrop-grumman-pgp-root-ca
it is merely one of the public whipping posts http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/faq
cold air http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=39
computation http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=4
cryptography http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=45
friends http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=48
mathematics http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=34
nonloper http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=15
softwaresucks http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=23
no comments http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1662#respond
terraforming the “mycloud mini” : tty. http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1644
“mycloud mini” http://www.frostyplace.com/index.php?story_id=11202
pogoplug http://btcbase.org/log-search?q=pogo
- http://www.loper-os.org/pub/mycloud_mini_tty.jpg
bitcoin http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=42
cold air http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=39
hardware http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=7
nonloper http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=15
2 comments http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1644#comments
phuctor is back! http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1639
phuctor http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1526
back http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com
- http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/stats
cold air http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=39
computation http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=4
cryptography http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=45
friends http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=48
mathematics http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=34
nonloper http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=15
papers http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=16
shouldersgiants http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=21
no comments http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1639#respond
vectored signatures, or the elements of a possible v-algebra. http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1545
versionatron https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/version_control
v http://trilema.com/2015/no-such-labs-releases-v-for-victory
ben vulpes’s http://www.btcalpha.com/wot/user/ben_vulpes
introduction to v http://cascadianhacker.com/blog/2016/02/07_v-tronics-101-a-gentle-introduction-to-the-most-serene-republic-of-bitcoins-cryptographically-backed-version-control-system.html
scurrying little vermin http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1299
circle of folks http://thebitcoin.foundation/index.html
mildly-enhanced http://deedbot.org/deed-372115-1.txt
gnu diff https://www.gnu.org/software/diffutils
pgp key http://www.loper-os.org/pgp.asc
your wot http://www.btcalpha.com/wot/user/asciilifeform/
a handful of other useful operations http://therealbitcoin.org/ml/btc-dev/2015-august/000161.html
spartan http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/this-is-sparta
cryptographic http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=45
fits-in-head http://search.bitcoin-assets.com/?q=fits-in-head
some thinking folks found it to have interesting implications http://trilema.com/2016/the-v-manual-genesis
created some very spiffy applications http://104.131.72.249/patches
expertly re-implemented http://thebitcoin.foundation/v/v-20160220.tar.gz
almost fit to be thought of as an actual tool http://search.bitcoin-assets.com/?q=v.pl
seals http://szabo.best.vwh.net/seals.html
hardware rng http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1475
dialogue with an nsa agent-provocateur. http://www.loper-os.org/pub/ninjashogun.txt
memetic bomb http://www.infinityplus.co.uk/stories/blit.htm
to ascertain that the item existed in its present form when you first came across it http://therealbitcoin.org/ml/btc-dev/2015-february/000047.html
cold air http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=39
computation http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=4
cryptography http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=45
friends http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=48
idea http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=9
mathematics http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=34
modestproposal http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=14
nonloper http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=15
philosophy http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=17
5 comments http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1545#comments
« previous http://www.loper-os.org/?paged=2
bitcoin http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=42
books http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=3
chumpatronics http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=47
cold air http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=39
computation http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=4
copyright http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=5
cryptography http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=45
distractions http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=6
friends http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=48
hardware http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=7
hot air http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=8
idea http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=9
lisp http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=33
lispmachine http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=10
loperos http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=11
mathematics http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=34
memory http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=12
mit http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=13
modestproposal http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=14
nonloper http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=15
papers http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=16
philosophy http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=17
photo http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=37
physics http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=18
predictions http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=36
progress http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=19
reactions http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=31
shouldersgiants http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=21
softwarearchaeology http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=43
softwaresucks http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=23
symbolics http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=24
uncategorized http://www.loper-os.org/?cat=1
intro: part i http://www.loper-os.org/?p=4
intro: part ii http://www.loper-os.org/?p=8
no such labs http://nosuchlabs.com
phuctor http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com
therealbitcoin http://therealbitcoin.org
tmsr http://trilema.com/2016/how-to-participate-in-the-affairs-of-the-most-serene-republic/
abstract heresies http://funcall.blogspot.com/
angry unix programmer http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~psilord/blog/
arcane sentiment http://arcanesentiment.blogspot.com
axis of eval http://axisofeval.blogspot.com/
blogdial http://irdial.com/blogdial
chris harrison http://www.chrisharrison.net/projects/research.html
dmitry orlov http://cluborlov.blogspot.com/
don lancaster http://www.tinaja.com/
doron zeilberger http://www.math.rutgers.edu/~zeilberg/pj.html
erik naggum http://www.xach.com/naggum/articles/
freedom to tinker http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/
frozenlock http://frozenlock.org
greg egan http://gregegan.customer.netspace.net.au
ignorantguru https://igurublog.wordpress.com
ilkka kokkarinen http://fourthcheckraise.blogspot.com/
imagine27 http://jng.imagine27.com/
irreal http://irreal.org/blog/
john walker http://www.fourmilab.ch/
lambda the ultimate http://lambda-the-ultimate.org/
lemonodor http://lemonodor.com/
lichtblau http://lichteblau.blogspot.com/
lispian http://lispian.net/
micro_research http://1010.co.uk/
mircea popescu http://trilema.com
moron lab http://moronlab.blogspot.com/
neil dickson http://ndickson.wordpress.com/
pascal costanza http://p-cos.blogspot.com/
peter woit http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/
philip greenspun http://philip.greenspun.com/
richard gabriel http://www.dreamsongs.com/
richard kulisz http://richardkulisz.blogspot.com/
roly perera http://dynamicaspects.org/blog/index.html
scott locklin http://scottlocklin.wordpress.com/
shtetl-optimized http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/
steve dutch http://www.uwgb.edu/dutchs/pscindx.htm
structural insight http://fexpr.blogspot.com/
ted nelson http://ted.hyperland.com/
terence tao http://terrytao.wordpress.com/
terry davis http://www.templeos.org/
theodore gray http://www.theodoregray.com/
uncle al http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/
unenumerated http://unenumerated.blogspot.com/
unqualified reservations http://unqualified-reservations.blogspot.com/
xah lee http://xahlee.org/pagetwo_dir/more.html
bitcoin, or how to hammer in nails with a microscope. http://www.loper-os.org/?p=939
don’t blame the mice http://www.loper-os.org/?p=1299
engelbart’s violin http://www.loper-os.org/?p=861
going nowhere really fast, or how computers only come in two speeds. http://www.loper-os.org/?p=300
no formats, no format wars. http://www.loper-os.org/?p=309
non-apple’s mistake http://www.loper-os.org/?p=132
steam lisp http://www.loper-os.org/?p=388
stierlitz, the fearless, driver-less bus analyzer. http://www.loper-os.org/?p=702
the wisdom of erik naggum http://www.loper-os.org/?p=165
thumbs down for clojure http://www.loper-os.org/?p=42
where lisp fails: at turning people into fungible cogs. http://www.loper-os.org/?p=69
why hypercard had to die http://www.loper-os.org/?p=568
ezotgdbg https://github.com/asciilifeform/ezotgdbg
stierlitz https://github.com/asciilifeform/stierlitz
badatentropy http://www.loper-os.org/bad-at-entropy/manmach.html
microwriter emulator http://www.loper-os.org/mwemu/mwemu.html
lmkbd https://code.google.com/p/lmkbd/source/browse/#svn/trunk
paralleleye http://www.loper-os.org/vintage/paralleleye/eye.html
parasid http://www.loper-os.org/vintage/parallelsid/parasid.html
october 2016 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201610
september 2016 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201609
july 2016 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201607
june 2016 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201606
april 2016 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201604
march 2016 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201603
december 2015 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201512
october 2015 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201510
august 2015 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201508
may 2015 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201505
june 2014 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201406
april 2014 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201404
march 2014 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201403
january 2014 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201401
december 2013 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201312
november 2013 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201311
october 2013 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201310
september 2013 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201309
july 2013 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201307
may 2013 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201305
april 2013 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201304
february 2013 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201302
january 2013 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201301
october 2012 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201210
september 2012 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201209
august 2012 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201208
june 2012 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201206
may 2012 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201205
april 2012 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201204
march 2012 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201203
february 2012 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201202
january 2012 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201201
december 2011 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201112
november 2011 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201111
october 2011 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201110
july 2011 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201107
may 2011 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201105
april 2011 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201104
march 2011 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201103
january 2011 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201101
november 2010 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201011
september 2010 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201009
august 2010 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201008
july 2010 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201007
june 2010 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201006
april 2010 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201004
march 2010 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201003
february 2010 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201002
january 2010 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=201001
december 2009 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=200912
october 2009 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=200910
september 2009 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=200909
august 2009 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=200908
july 2009 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=200907
june 2009 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=200906
may 2009 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=200905
march 2009 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=200903
february 2009 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=200902
january 2009 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=200901
december 2008 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=200812
september 2008 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=200809
august 2008 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=200808
july 2008 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=200807
june 2008 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=200806
may 2008 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=200805
february 2008 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=200802
january 2008 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=200801
december 2007 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=200712
november 2007 http://www.loper-os.org/?m=200711
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http://www.loper-os.org/pub/ycombinator_eagerly_eats_nsa_shit.png
http://www.loper-os.org/pub/sage/sage_and_gb.jpg
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loper os "you can't get to the moon by piling up chairs." home about loper os guiding principles rss feed contact pgp « previous still tenser, said the censor. published on: monday october 03 2016 stay classy, ycombinator. posted in: chumpatronics, cryptography, hot air, nonloper, philosophy, softwaresucks by stanislav 2 comments the care and feeding of the sage smartprobe. published on: saturday october 01 2016 if you cured your sage smartprobe of its congenital disease as per the last article on the subject, you may now be wondering what to do with it. the vendor supplied a massive java shitware with the thing, which does not merit any discussion whatsoever. instead, we will use the probe’s very spiffy gdb-compatible interface. configure your gdb as follows: gdbinit.txt: ### log all instructions set logging on set logging file gdb_out.txt ### only if you want to see the raw gdb packets... #set debug remote 1 ### if you're debugging the bios set architecture i386 ### if you are debugging a warmed-up os # set architecture i386:x86-64 ### where the probe is: target remote /dev/ttyacm0 ### or, if it is connected to your lan, ### let's say at 192.168.1.111, # target remote 192.168.1.111:2159 # show instructions on single-step set disassemble-next-line on # disable evil, heretical gas syntax #set disassembly-flavor intel ### if you want the ncurses gui in gdb # layout asm so, for instance, let’s connect to a freshly-booted amd g-series box spinning in coreboot’s boot selector menu, $ gdb --command=gdbinit.txt gnu gdb (gentoo 7.8.1 vanilla) 7.8.1 copyright (c) 2014 free software foundation, inc. license gplv3+: gnu gpl version 3 or later this is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. there is no warranty, to the extent permitted by law. type "show copying" and "show warranty" for details. this gdb was configured as "x86_64-pc-linux-gnu". type "show configuration" for configuration details. for bug reporting instructions, please see: . find the gdb manual and other documentation resources online at: . for help, type "help". type "apropos word" to search for commands related to "word". the target architecture is assumed to be i386 (gdb) si 0x001015ae in ?? () => 0x001015ae: c3 ret (gdb) 0x001035a9 in ?? () => 0x001035a9: 29 f0 sub %esi,%eax (gdb) 0x001035ab in ?? () => 0x001035ab: 19 fa sbb %edi,%edx (gdb) 0x001035ad in ?? () => 0x001035ad: 39 ea cmp %ebp,%edx (gdb) 0x001035af in ?? () => 0x001035af: 72 f3 jb 0x1035a4 (gdb) 0x001035b1 in ?? () => 0x001035b1: 77 04 ja 0x1035b7 (gdb) 0x001035b3 in ?? () => 0x001035b3: 39 d8 cmp %ebx,%eax (gdb) 0x001035b5 in ?? () => 0x001035b5: 72 ed jb 0x1035a4 (gdb) 0x001035b7 in ?? () => 0x001035b7: 83 c4 0c add $0xc,%esp (gdb) 0x001035ba in ?? () => 0x001035ba: 5b pop %ebx (gdb) c continuing. ^c program received signal sigtrap, trace/breakpoint trap. 0x001035b5 in ?? () => 0x001035b5: 72 ed jb 0x1035a4 (gdb) q a debugging session is active. inferior 1 [remote target] will be killed. quit anyway? (y or n) y i will add that the probe also works great with ida pro’s gdb interface. or whatever other, similar front-end you might fancy. but! in order to make proper use of the probe, you will need the vendor-specific command set for manipulating the dc power, pci bus, jtag chain, and so forth. these were at one point published on the vendor’s site, which has vanished without a trace. i have made a cleaned-up html version: sage smartprobe gdb command manual. note that i have discovered certain undocumented commands. these will be the subject of a later article! posted in: cold air, computation, hardware, nonloper, shouldersgiants, softwarearchaeology, softwaresucks by stanislav 1 comment how to make your own lamport parachute from common household materials. published on: wednesday september 28 2016 the thought began, as many good things begin, in #trilema. users of the wot, of v, and other systems where your cryptographic identity is wholly in your own hands1 live with a certain risk of “cryptographic death” – i.e. the compromise of one’s signing key. a conscientious user of public key crypto might keep the thought of this calamity somewhere in the back of his head, filed right next to “piano falling on my head” and other misfortunes from which there can be no return. a correctly-generated rsa key is unlikely to be broken via cryptoanalytic means within the owner’s lifetime. but “never say never!” and there is always the possibility of a mass slaughter of keys, a “cryptocalypse”, where the public key cryptosystem of your choice is broken (or, via whatever mathematical advances, weakens, and the cost of deriving your private key from your public key becomes tractably low.) the popular notion of key revocation is a questionable business because it attempts to impose a political structure onto an uncooperative mathematical reality — in the jargon of #trilema, it is “promisetronic, not protocolic.” someone who takes possession of your signing key can walk around and befoul your reputation, ‘who steals my purse steals trash; ’tis something, nothing; ‘twas mine, ’tis his, and has been slave to thousands; but he that filches from me my good name…’ without regard to time or space – he can sign whatever he likes and attribute it to you. and those who have not received your revocation signal will accept the forgeries as the genuine article. nothing whatsoever can be done to rescue a compromised signing key. but might it be possible to rescue its owner from wot death by establishing an unforgeable continuity of identity ? the answer is: “possibly.” the bitcoin blockchain2 gives us a very strong mechanism for cryptographic timestamping3 – i.e. the act of certifying, to a skeptical observer, that some particular string of bits had indeed been in existence at a particular point in time. the current state-of-the-art implementation of this concept is called deedbot, and the reader is invited to become familiar with it. if you make an arrangement with your associates in advance that a certain public key deedbotted at a certain time is to be regarded as your emergency fallback, you have a kind of “parachute” on which you may conceivably float safely to the ground in the event of your plane’s wings, if you will, breaking off — i.e. a signing key compromise.4 however, the obvious caveat is that the “parachute” keypair must exist at the time of the deedbotting, and its public key must be, well, public. this can be a problem in the scenario where the cryptosystem itself- e.g., rsa – is publicly broken. the enemy can now do as he pleases with your primary and fallback keys, and you – the cryptographic you – have died a permanent death. and all known public key signature schemes rely on unproven5 number-theoretic conjectures, and may conceivably fall this very night. all except for one… l. lamport’s 1979 “one time signature” algorithm rests on no number-theoretic conjecture, but merely on the strength of a collision-resistant hash of the operator’s choosing. on account of certain disadvantages which will soon become apparent to the reader, it is used virtually nowhere. but it so happens that it is entirely perfect for our “parachute” scenario. a complete and usable implementation of this “lamport parachute” is presented in this article. it is written in 68 69 lines of bash and makes use strictly of commonplace userland utilities, such as may be met with on a typical linux box. this somewhat strange choice of implementation language (it certainly does not shine, for instance, speedwise) is deliberate: the user is expected to understand each individual part, so that the function of the whole becomes unambiguously apparent, like 2+2. as the field of cryptography is slowly reconquered from the schneiers and other scumbags presently maggoting on top of it, expect this type of didactic presentation to become ordinary practice. a lamport public key consists of two lists, let’s call them a and b, of randomly-generated bitstrings that have been hashed with a collision-resistant hash and thereafter published. to make use of such a key, the owner hashes the payload being signed, and for each bit that is equal to 0 in the resulting hash, reveals the original pre-hash string from column a, whereas if it is equal to 1 he reveals a pre-hash string from column b. for reasons which i hope are quite obvious to the alert reader, a lamport public key is to be made use of only once. and such a key is quite bulky, as is the signature resulting from its use.6 but enough words! it is time for the deeds! we shall generate7 our lamport parachute like this: lamport_mkpriv.sh #!/bin/bash if [ $# -lt 2 ] then echo "usage: ./`basename $0` payloadbits strengthbits" exit 1 fi for i in $(seq 1 $(($1 * 2))) ; do echo `od -n $(($2 / 8)) -an -t x1 -v /dev/random | tr -d " \n"` ; done | xargs -n 2 all this does is to give us two columns of strengthbits-sized random integers, times payloadbits rows. specifically: $ ./lamport_mkpriv.sh 256 512 > privkey.txt this will create a parachute private key suitable for use with sha256 – i.e. it is able to sign a 256-bit payload. the strength – or length of the random strings – in this example is 512 bits. it is pointlessly suicidal to use a strength value below the output length of your chosen hash algorithm, but otherwise the choice is unconstrained, so long as it byte-aligns.8 now we would like to generate the corresponding public key: lamport_priv2pub.sh #!/bin/bash if [ $# -lt 1 ] then echo "usage: ./`basename $0` hashutil < privkey.txt > pubkey.txt" exit 1 fi for x in $(cat) ; do echo -n $x | xxd -r -p | $1 | cut -d ' ' -f1 ; done | xargs -n 2 we simply apply the hashutil of choice to the bitstrings produced by lamport_mkpriv.sh. and it is done like this: $ ./lamport_priv2pub.sh sha256sum < privkey.txt > pubkey.txt now we have the public key. if you are generating a “battlefield”9 key, it is now time to consider its intended usage scenario. if the payload of the signature is known in advance – e.g., a “warrant canary”, or some other such thing – you will generate its signature immediately, and the private key may then be destroyed immediately.10 otherwise the private key is to be retained, shielded stegatronically from prying eyes, and hidden safely far away from your usual places of business or habitation, or other locations liable to be searched by the enemy. let’s make a second public/private keypair of the same type: $ ./lamport_mkpriv.sh 256 512 > another_privkey.txt $ ./lamport_priv2pub.sh sha256sum < another_privkey.txt > another_pubkey.txt and now we should like to make use of our lamport parachute. let’s sign a message: lamport_encode.sh #!/bin/bash if [ $# -lt 1 ] then echo "usage: ./`basename $0` privkey.txt < hexpayload > encoded.txt" exit 1 fi payload=$(cat | tr '[:lower:]' '[:upper:]') len=$((${#payload} * 4)) bits=$(printf "%*s" $len $(echo "ibase=16;obase=2;$payload" | bc | tr -d '\\\n') | tr ' ' 0) while ifs= read -r p; do bit=${bits:0:1}; bits=${bits:1}; echo $p | cut -d ' ' -f$(($bit + 1)); done < "$1" here we simply iterate over the bits of the payload, choosing the unhashed original private strings from column a or b as discussed earlier. remember, we generated a private key that can carry a 256-bit payload. it does not necessarily have to be a hash, but in this example we will take one, e.g.: $ echo "attack at dawn." | sha256sum | cut -d ' ' -f1 1d6c270d7cc7e82a816ffb7bc3797d213b24d9d17af48f4b3b8d01fb43ed15c3 echo "attack at dawn." | sha256sum | cut -d ' ' -f1 | ./lamport_encode.sh privkey.txt > encoded.txt and we get a signature. now you must destroy the private key! it shall never be used again! quite analogously to a vernam "one time pad" -- the re-use of a lamport private key is cryptographically suicidal. and now some counterparty, with whom you have taken care to share your parachute's public key, wishes to verify the signature. it happens like this: lamport_decode.sh #!/bin/bash if [ $# -lt 2 ] then echo "usage: ./`basename $0` hashutil pubkey.txt < encoded.txt > hexpayload" exit 1 fi bits="" while read -u 3 pkl; do if ! read el then break fi bits="$bits$( case $(echo -n $el | xxd -r -p | $1 | cut -d ' ' -f1) in $(echo $pkl | cut -d ' ' -f1)) echo "0" ;; $(echo $pkl | cut -d ' ' -f2)) echo "1" ;; *) exit 1; break ;; esac)" if [[ $? == 1 ]] then echo false >&2; exit 1 fi done 3< $2 padlen=$(od -n 1 /dev/zero | $1 | cut -d ' ' -f1 | tr -d " \n" | wc -c) printf "%*s\n" $padlen $(echo "ibase=2;obase=10000;$bits" | bc | tr -d '\\\n' | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]') | tr ' ' 0 here we simply take each bitstring from an encoded parachute message (the signature) -- hash it with the pre-agreed hashing algo; and determine which column of each respective row of the public key the result is found in. (if the answer is "neither", the decoder terminates and warns us.) so, for instance: $ ./lamport_decode.sh sha256sum pubkey.txt < encoded.txt 1d6c270d7cc7e82a816ffb7bc3797d213b24d9d17af48f4b3b8d01fb43ed15c3 we have decoded a payload. if we had agreed, in advance, that this payload is the sha256 hash of a document, e.g.: $ diff < (./lamport_decode.sh sha256sum pubkey.txt < encoded.txt) <(echo "attack at dawn." | sha256sum | cut -d ' ' -f1) we are able to verify it. now let's try the same, but with the wrong public key: $ diff < (./lamport_decode.sh sha256sum another_pubkey.txt < encoded.txt) <(echo "attack at dawn." | sha256sum | cut -d ' ' -f1) false 0a1 > 1d6c270d7cc7e82a816ffb7bc3797d213b24d9d17af48f4b3b8d01fb43ed15c3 observe that it is possible to make use of any hashing algorithm11 you may happen to like, so long as you have it available as a command-line program. epilogue. a v-genesis for these didactic examples is available12 here; seal - here.. as opposed to... the other kind. where your self-appointed masters could impersonate you at their leisure if they so choose. ↩ there exists, and can exist, precisely one blockchain. ↩ all other cryptographic timestamp schemes currently known rely on a "trusted third party." and a sane user trusts "third parties" no further than he can throw them! ↩ if it so happens that you learn of your private key having been compromised before the consequences become irreparably grave, you should consider yourself extraordinarily lucky. just ask, e.g., admiral isoroku yamamoto. ↩ the "hardness" -- i.e. the amount of computation required to break an rsa key, of whatever length, is unknown. and if your university professor taught you that it is known, or -- more egregiously -- that "it is equivalent to integer-factoring", then he is not merely an ignoramus but a particular kind of liar. ↩ there exist certain questionable schemes to somewhat reduce this bulk, but i have deliberately eschewed them in light of the gravity of the task at hand. good men may well die from your "reasonable" optimizations, your "negligible" losses of strength, loathesome hucksters. ↩ chances are that lamport key generation, being an entropy-hungry affair, will take an unacceptably long time on your box. the temptation to replace "/dev/random" with "/dev/urandom" will be great. needless to say that if the key is being generated for battlefield use, such a substitution is impermissible. but if you are following along simply for study, go ahead. just remember to switch it back before crafting that missile launch key... ↩ i.e. a multiple of 8. ↩ i.e. for use in practice. ↩ along, if your situation is sufficiently grave to merit this, you will also cremate the very machine used in these operations! ↩ one interesting tidbit is that public key signatures are only possible if trapdoor functions exist -- see rompel, 1990. so, today, or 100 years from now, you're stuck choosing a hash algo. ↩ strictly under popescu's license. ↩ posted in: bitcoin, cold air, computation, cryptography, friends, idea, mathematics, nonloper, papers, philosophy, shouldersgiants, softwarearchaeology, softwaresucks, uncategorized by stanislav 10 comments phuctored ssh public keys. published on: friday september 23 2016 phuctored ssh public keys to date. keys were obtained from a scan of the complete ipv4 space. we have gone approximately 20% of the way through the data set at the time of this writing. click on the ip addresses to view a key in phuctor, or on the ssh hello string to view pertinent discussions. a snapshot of all phuctored keys at the time of writing can be viewed here, if the main site is slow under load. (feel free to ask questions !) ip ssh hello ssl hello 112.16.4.21 ssh-1.99-comware-5.20 112.16.65.245 112.16.65.247 112.16.95.66 ssh-1.99-rgos_ssh_1.0 177.234.0.97 ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5 177.234.11.229 ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5 177.234.13.179 ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5 177.234.13.241 ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5 177.234.15.27 177.234.1.73 ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5 177.234.1.91 ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5 177.234.4.97 ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5 177.234.6.21 ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5 177.234.9.13 ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5 183.246.69.24 ssh-1.99-comware-5.20 187.188.126.28 187.72.155.221 ssh-2.0-audiocodes subject=/cn=acl_3353352 187.72.216.78 ssh-2.0-audiocodes subject=/cn=acl_3353177 189.112.138.254 189.203.181.149 ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5 189.203.181.7 ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5 189.203.72.147 ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5 190.39.56.107 197.221.61.38 ssh-2.0-openssh_3.8.1p1 debian-8.sarge.4 197.221.63.150 200.146.242.241 ssh-2.0-audiocodes subject=/cn=acl_3348823 201.101.37.44 ssh-2.0-openssh_6.0p1 debian-4+deb7u2 201.16.189.38 201.249.207.150 ssh-1.99-huawei-1.5 subject=/name=ar157-self-signed-certificate-210235384810e4001320 202.166.221.118 2.116.209.1 ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5 217.57.196.177 ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5 217.57.196.179 ssh-1.99-dopra-1.5 223.94.78.217 ssh-1.99-comware-5.20 59.21.182.242 ssh-2.0-openssh_5.9 subject=/c=us/st=california/l=sunnyvale/o=aerohive/ou=default/cn=hiveap 66.233.213.117 ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2 68.14.242.210 ssh-2.0-openssh_6.6 subject=/c=us/st=florida/l=orlando/o=creative manager – az office/cn=gnatbox.creative-manager.com/emailaddress=support@iccsllc.com 71.39.252.162 74.45.0.60 ssh-2.0-openssh_4.1 subject=/c=us/st=california/l=sunnyvale/o=tropos networks/ou=manufacturing/cn=tropos router/emailaddress=support@tropos.com 74.45.228.159 ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2 subject=/c=us/st=california/l=sunnyvale/o=tropos networks/ou=manufacturing/cn=tropos router/emailaddress=support@tropos.com 74.45.228.160 ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2 subject=/c=us/st=california/l=sunnyvale/o=tropos networks/ou=manufacturing/cn=tropos router/emailaddress=support@tropos.com 74.45.228.49 ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2 subject=/c=us/st=california/l=sunnyvale/o=tropos networks/ou=manufacturing/cn=tropos router/emailaddress=support@tropos.com 74.45.228.86 ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2 subject=/c=us/st=california/l=sunnyvale/o=tropos networks/ou=manufacturing/cn=tropos router/emailaddress=support@tropos.com 74.45.228.97 ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2 subject=/c=us/st=california/l=sunnyvale/o=tropos networks/ou=manufacturing/cn=tropos router/emailaddress=support@tropos.com 74.45.229.217 ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2 subject=/c=us/st=california/l=sunnyvale/o=tropos networks/ou=manufacturing/cn=tropos router/emailaddress=support@tropos.com 74.45.231.125 ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2 subject=/c=us/st=california/l=sunnyvale/o=tropos networks/ou=manufacturing/cn=tropos router/emailaddress=support@tropos.com 74.45.231.136 ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2 subject=/c=us/st=california/l=sunnyvale/o=tropos networks/ou=manufacturing/cn=tropos router/emailaddress=support@tropos.com 74.45.231.156 ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2 subject=/c=us/st=california/l=sunnyvale/o=tropos networks/ou=manufacturing/cn=tropos router/emailaddress=support@tropos.com 78.188.162.184 ssh-2.0-rosssh 85.14.248.152 ssh-2.0-openssh_6.0p1 debian-4+deb7u3 85.218.41.103 ssh-2.0-openssh_5.9 subject=/c=us/st=california/l=sunnyvale/o=aerohive/ou=default/cn=hiveap 91.229.251.116 ssh-2.0-rosssh 94.141.150.121 ssh-2.0-rosssh 96.24.7.172 ssh-2.0-openssh_5.2 posted in: bitcoin, cold air, computation, cryptography, friends, mathematics, nonloper, philosophy, softwaresucks by stanislav no comments on the matter of brian krebs. published on: friday september 23 2016 the www of brian krebs, perhaps the second-most-worshiped1 patron saint to all english-speaking “computer security” charlatans — is sitting sadly offline today on account of a ~tb/sec ddos flood.2 his titanic bandwidth, it turns out, was provided gratis by akamai – spamatronicists par excellence and industrial-scale enablers of everything that makes the modern-day www a rancid sewer. until it wasn’t. as soon krebs began to cost them serious coin, he was dropped like a discarded candy wrapper. and i’m expected, apparently, to see the misadventures of krebs as a lamentable thing. but i do not — and am quite ready to explain why not to the patient and curious reader. krebs is renowned for his investigations of “cybercrime”, which in his eyes consists of russian (for some… reason – almost exclusively russian) spammers, malware artists, and “carders”. now, spam as we know it exists largely for two purposes: to mooch, by various means, from the great gas giants of advertising-crapolade, e.g., google; and to spread malware. the latter exists mainly to facilitate “carding.” 3 and if we listen to krebs and his ilk, we might believe that these problems are problems because there is a faraway country, full of evil untermenschen, who like nothing more than to steal the last penny from every honest american joe, and to pollute his precious bodily fluids. and who decided that the best way to do this is to write virii and send spam. and krebs would also have us believe that the pill against such headaches is to make a pompous www site, with many flow charts, containing some names of especially-uppity untermenschen who are then to be kidnapped by nato gauleiters and shipped, bound and gagged, to american prisons.. now apparently, if we listen to krebs et al., writing virii is a “cybercrime” — but forcefeeding microsoft’s sorry excuse for an operating system to the ~entire planet, for decades, somehow is not. and stealing credit card numbers is a “cybercrime” — but forcing people to use a financial system where someone can drain your account by learning a constant string, printed in plain text4 on a piece of plastic in your pocket, somehow is not. and guess what else – distributing amateur-hour “spyware” is a “cybercrime” — but artfully sabotaging open source software somehow is not. when you’re the nsa. because it is not about “crime”. it is about the hegemony of a particular set of crowned criminals whom krebs shills for. when i wrote to krebs regarding the mahmood khadeer bombshell – the most recent and spectacular of a series of discoveries proving the existence, in the wild, of sabotaged pgp clients – there was no response. which, in retrospect, ought to have been no sort of surprise. because the mass5 sabotage of rsa implementations was not a crime authored by any criminal krebs is interested in prosecuting, but by his beloved masters. who hung him out to dry today. “the world’s smallest violin plays.” edit: the next day, krebs was taken under the wing of google’s “project shield”: project shield welcomes applications from websites serving news, human rights, or elections monitoring content. we do not provide service to other types of content, including gaming, businesses, or individual blogs. see our user content and conduct policy for more details. say hello to the internet of the future! where usg shills are hosted on an “infrastructural”, one-way tv-style “internet”, and everybody else gets to inhabit the remains of the old, ddosable kind. after schneier, of course. ↩ the ddos-enabling design of the internet as we know it is no accident. ↩ “carding” is a crime which happens at the pleasure of certain banks, who profit handsomely from it. this is not an especially well-kept secret. ↩ public-key cryptography has been around for quite a while. ↩ we’ve found, one can surmise, only the tip of the birthday theorem iceberg thus far. ↩ posted in: chumpatronics, cryptography, distractions, hot air, philosophy, softwaresucks by stanislav 5 comments a complete pill for the sage smartprobe. published on: monday september 19 2016 the sage smartprobe was a very spiffy “hard ice” debugger, one of the few ever manufactured for use with modern (2010s) amd x86-64 processors, and – as far as i’m aware – the only one ever sold on the mass market, rather than as part of “favourite son” deals (as, e.g., intel’s, and arium’s similar products were, and perhaps still are.) probe (right hand side) and "gizmoboard" amd g-series motherboard (left hand side.) quite a few of these things ended up bundled with various dev boards, saddled with time-limited demo expiration (yes, a time-limited hardware peripheral! don’t ask me…) the vendor perma-re-enabled an expired probe for a small fee. sage eng. llc, it appears, is long dead. leaving no trace! how and why it died is unknown to me. so now, instead of being unique tools in the development of, e.g., coreboot, or whatever other attempts at sane utilization of x86-64 iron, the demo probes are stuck in limbo, working as so many peculiar paperweights. this is a crying shame. now you cannot unbrick the expired probes for any price. (at least not by buying the magic code from the original maker…) so, without further delay, let us get one of these patients onto the operating table: jtag test points. (click for full size.) now you could connect the thing to your favourite openocd-compatible jtag probe, and play around with the internals. e.g., this gdb script will give you an instruction trace. there are many interesting things to be learned, re: the command set (most of which is gdb-compatible, but there are a few interesting sharp edges.) or you could skip straight to the pill: sage_pill.py (sha256: 2f9ce44fe069705a7ee83c0f4c733a6a0cc374613429c5c1f47a8481aa464b60) sage_last_public_fw.tar.gz (sha256: 30c005febfbff531a2b9d06ef8c2c41fedb2c8993a2992a373fbeb66900fbaf8) 1) download the pill and the fw image. 2) check the sha256 sums. 3) unpack the firmware image. 4) plug in the probe. 5) ./sage_pill.py sage_last_public_fw.bin /dev/ttyacm0 you may have ended up with some device other than ttyacm0 when you plugged it in. find out which. the script will need to run with sufficient privileges to talk to the “modem”. it will ask for a final confirmation prior to firing. 6) enjoy a 100% working x86-64 “hard ice”. this article is continued here. posted in: cold air, computation, hardware, nonloper, photo, softwarearchaeology by stanislav no comments tears of the phucked. published on: friday july 22 2016 grumman hellcat. phuctor – rewritten and revved up on new hardware in april – is presently eating ssh rsa keys from a scan of the complete ipv4 space. and, on occasion, breaking some. and generating other laughs as well.  in today’s server logs: 134.223.116.158 - - [22/jul/2016:15:54:57 +0000] "get /gpgkey/50840391e5677882196999c9ae77f3177e6cbf8d35fb4f1fef848cfadf9088b1 http/1.1" 200 3425 "http://134.223.116.149:15871/cgi-bin/blockpage.cgi?ws-session=2010817170 " what’s that? a ‘websense’ censortron control panel, apparently. who might it belong to ? could it be: isn’t it just a little bit too late for this nonsense? plus, your monkemployees can still read the page when they clock out and go home. or on their phones, in the toilets, etc.  why bother with this nonsense ? phuctor isn’t even a ‘wikileak’ or the like, it is merely one of the public whipping posts to which you have been tied, by your own hands, long ago. posted in: cold air, computation, cryptography, friends, mathematics, nonloper, softwaresucks by stanislav no comments terraforming the “mycloud mini” : tty. published on: thursday june 02 2016 “mycloud mini” is a ~$50, dual-core arm, 256m ram, 256m flash, dual sata box, in various respects similar to the famous pogoplug. use a standard (e.g., cp1202) ttl converter. and you will get: stage-1 bootloader 1 28 10:36:29 cst 2011 attempting to set plla to 750mhz ... plla_ctrl0 : 0x0000000a plla_ctrl1 : 0x000f0000 plla_ctrl2 : 0x001d01a0 plla_ctrl3 : 0x00000017 plla set setup memory, testing, image 0 hdr len: 0x0001ac3c hdr crc: 0xb931ad17 ok u-boot 1.1.2 (oct 28 2011 - 10:44:29) u-boot code: 60d00000 -> 60d1ac3c bss: -> 60d1f2f4 ram configuration: bank #0: 60000000 256 mb sram configuration: 64kb at 0x50000000 nand:256 mib *** warning - bad crc, using default environment in: serial out: serial err: serial setting linux mem= boot arg value reading upgrade flag from nand address 0x01ec0000 : 0 hit any key to stop autoboot: 0 $ posted in: bitcoin, cold air, hardware, nonloper by stanislav 2 comments phuctor is back! published on: friday april 29 2016 phuctor is back! now using bernstein’s algorithm (d. j. bernstein. how to find smooth parts of integers.) the entire set is pairwise-gcd’d hourly. posted in: cold air, computation, cryptography, friends, mathematics, nonloper, papers, shouldersgiants by stanislav no comments vectored signatures, or the elements of a possible v-algebra. published on: friday march 18 2016 once upon a time (in august of ‘15, to be exact) i wrote a very simple versionatron called ‘v‘. edit: see also ben vulpes’s excellent introduction to v. v is a carefully-designed poison against the scurrying little vermin who feed on the proverbial ‘fear, uncertainty, and doubt.’ for readers who are not in the little circle of folks who regularly use the thing, i will outline the – very simple – idea: you diff two texts (source code trees, generic human-readables, or whatever cocktail of the two you happen to have) using a mildly-enhanced gnu diff, sign the output with your pgp key, and publish it. after this is done, people in your wot will be able to correctly (in logical order!) apply the patch(-es) – and perform a handful of other useful operations – at their leisure. 1 in exchange for a certain amount of headache – and a willingness to endure a bit of spartan cruelty – v buys you version control with absolute cryptographic provenance of every delta, fully stateless operation (nothing you do will affect the output of a future operation unless you explicitly move files), a total extermination of the familiar “hidden file” shit-soup placed in directories by, e.g., git and svn, and – most importantly – simplicity, via an absolute minimum of moving parts. v fits-in-head.2 now this kind of thing is certainly not for everyone. but some thinking folks found it to have interesting implications; others – created some very spiffy applications; yet others – expertly re-implemented ‘v’, to the point where it is almost fit to be thought of as an actual tool. half a year later, the thing is in active use by perhaps a dozen people. the one worrisome thing is that most extant v-patches still carry only one known (or, at best, two/three) signatures – seals. partly this is because people are lazyoverworked. but this is not the whole of it. there is also the fact that the act of producing a v-seal seems to have the connotation of wholesale acceptance, or endorsement, of the payload, and this is quite often the wrong thing. not only are there times when one would like to seal a payload with a caveat of one kind or another, but presently we have no means of conveying disapproval – other than by refraining from sealing. the latter act conveys very little useful information, and no permanent sealed record remains of the effort taken to actually understand the patch. this is a bad thing. one solution that has been floated is the inclusion of human-readable annotations with every seal. and this is well and good, and probably ought to happen, but perhaps it is possible to go a step further! i would like to seal objects in a way which machine-readably conveys disapproval, doubtful provenance, doubtful veracity, and related attributes. and, naturally this has nowhere to go in classical pgp, and so what i propose here is, for the moment, a mere gedankenexperiment. the root of the original problem is that a pgp signature per se conveys a scalar – precisely one bit of information: the existence of that signature. but what if it likewise carried a vector ? can we meaningfully decompose it into orthogonal dimensions ? let’s say, of four 2-bit components, vaguely inspired by the familiar unix file access permission scheme: dimension 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 meaning ‘hands’ 0 0 x x x x x x i did not create/modify any part. 3 0 1 x x x x x x i created/modified some part. 4 1 0 x x x x x x i created most, or modified the original beyond recognition. 5 1 1 x x x x x x i claim sole authorship.6 ‘eyes’ x x 0 0 x x x x i read none. made no attempt to.7 x x 0 1 x x x x i read some part; and/or skimmed some or all. x x 1 0 x x x x i read most of it. x x 1 1 x x x x i read all. ‘brain’ x x x x 0 0 x x i do not understand any.8 x x x x 0 1 x x i understand some, and/or poorly. x x x x 1 0 x x i understand. x x x x 1 1 x x i understand absolutely.9 ‘heart’10 x x x x x x 0 0 i distrust absolutely.11 x x x x x x 0 1 i distrust. x x x x x x 1 0 i trust.12 x x x x x x 1 1 i trust absolutely.13 … adding up to precisely one byte of information conveying belief regarding the payload. this might seem like claptrap until you realize that this seal vector is able to usefully describe a wide variety of objects, of the kind one might seal: 0xca a sample of output from a particular hardware rng. 0×78 my dialogue with an nsa agent-provocateur.14 0×01 a one time pad found in the pocket of a dead enemy spy. 0×2a a copy of macbeth. 0×38 a copy of the donation of constantine. 0×03 an encrypted message passing through my hands from one close friend to another. 0xdb your own pgp key. 0×14 a copy of the ms windows kernel. 0xff an order to launch the nukes. 0×00 a copy of a suspected memetic bomb. listed in no particular order, and not necessarily of the v-tronic variety. decoding is left as an exercise for the alert reader! to possibly be continued… any instance of a v ‘repository’ (there is no distinction between a v ‘repository’ and a working set) consists solely of human-readable texts – in their preferred form for modification: the patches, the keys, and the seals, all of which together can be pressed (the v term for the instantiation operation) into a working copy of the tree, consisting solely of what has been certified by the people whose keys were invoked in the pressing. the dependency order of the patches is automatically respected.↩ and not merely the source code of v itself – which, in the bulkiest of the extant implementations, weighs in somewhere south of a few hundred lines. the concept fits in one’s head, and can be readily explained in a restaurant over a napkin drawing within one cup of coffee.↩ or: “i had no part to play in the item’s having seen the light of day.”↩ or: “i had a part in causing the item to exist.”↩ or: “the item very certainly would not exist in anything like its present form without my doing.”↩ or: “no human hand but mine flipped, to my knowledge, so much as one bit therein.”↩ why would anybody sign something they haven’t read? there are many good reasons! e.g., to ascertain that the item existed in its present form when you first came across it, for instance.↩ this is context-sensitive. the meaning of “understand” is beyond the scope of this article.↩ generally this category is to be reserved for items like simple arithmetical facts, or your own name, or any other object about the nature and mechanics of which you have no doubt whatsoever.↩ this category contains no null. which should surprise no one, considering that the very intent of a seal is to convey some aspect of trust (in the original, unvectorized pgp, this is a vague and extremely context-sensitive thing, here – a more explicit relationship.)↩ “i am confident that the object, or the objects referred to therein, contain deliberate misrepresentations of reality, and may be dangerous to your health if perceived as fact, and to your honour – if relayed as factual.”↩ “i have no cause to believe that a lie is told in the object or objects referred to therein.”↩ “i trust the factual accuracy of the statement with my life and my honour.”↩ this leads us into meta/reference problems – does the distrust concern the object itself (the veracity of my copy of the dialogue) or of the statements appearing therein? this is to be resolved by the reader. but would it perhaps make sense to specify this as a whole vector dimension of its own?↩ posted in: cold air, computation, cryptography, friends, idea, mathematics, modestproposal, nonloper, philosophy by stanislav 5 comments « previous search for: support this site: bitcoin, by popular demand: 1nrrhyzmum2jahjeszuffitqg9w8undfzm categories bitcoin (19) books (6) chumpatronics (5) cold air (26) computation (25) copyright (3) cryptography (20) distractions (39) friends (9) hardware (28) hot air (56) idea (13) lisp (26) lispmachine (10) loperos (20) mathematics (23) memory (6) mit (2) modestproposal (14) nonloper (89) papers (5) philosophy (48) photo (12) physics (2) predictions (5) progress (7) reactions (3) shouldersgiants (24) softwarearchaeology (26) softwaresucks (46) symbolics (8) uncategorized (2) about intro: part i intro: part ii collaborations no such labs phuctor therealbitcoin tmsr people abstract heresies angry unix programmer arcane sentiment axis of eval blogdial chris harrison dmitry orlov don lancaster doron zeilberger erik naggum freedom to tinker frozenlock greg egan ignorantguru ilkka kokkarinen imagine27 irreal john walker lambda the ultimate lemonodor lichtblau lispian micro_research mircea popescu moron lab neil dickson pascal costanza peter woit philip greenspun richard gabriel richard kulisz roly perera scott locklin shtetl-optimized steve dutch structural insight ted nelson terence tao terry davis theodore gray uncle al unenumerated unqualified reservations xah lee popular posts bitcoin, or how to hammer in nails with a microscope. don’t blame the mice engelbart’s violin going nowhere really fast, or how computers only come in two speeds. no formats, no format wars. non-apple’s mistake steam lisp stierlitz, the fearless, driver-less bus analyzer. the wisdom of erik naggum thumbs down for clojure where lisp fails: at turning people into fungible cogs. why hypercard had to die sub-projects ezotgdbg stierlitz toys badatentropy microwriter emulator vintage lmkbd paralleleye parasid archives october 2016 september 2016 july 2016 june 2016 april 2016 march 2016 december 2015 october 2015 august 2015 may 2015 june 2014 april 2014 march 2014 january 2014 december 2013 november 2013 october 2013 september 2013 july 2013 may 2013 april 2013 february 2013 january 2013 october 2012 september 2012 august 2012 june 2012 may 2012 april 2012 march 2012 february 2012 january 2012 december 2011 november 2011 october 2011 july 2011 may 2011 april 2011 march 2011 january 2011 november 2010 september 2010 august 2010 july 2010 june 2010 april 2010 march 2010 february 2010 january 2010 december 2009 october 2009 september 2009 august 2009 july 2009 june 2009 may 2009 march 2009 february 2009 january 2009 december 2008 september 2008 august 2008 july 2008 june 2008 may 2008 february 2008 january 2008 december 2007 november 2007 meta log in copyright © 2016 stanislav datskovskiy · any views or opinions presented on this site are solely those of the author, stanislav datskovskiy, and do not necessarily represent those of his clients, employers, or associates. all information on this site is provided as-is, with no warranties whatsoever.


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