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kerchkhoffs' 6th principle of security /mt/archives/000195.html
fc++ #3 /mt/archives/000757.html
robust composition: towards a unified approach to access control and concurrency control /mt/archives/000702.html
concepts against man-in-the-browser attacks /mt/archives/000758.html
the market for silver bullets /mt/archives/000759.html
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adi shamir's 3 laws /mt/archives/000147.html
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financial cryptography http://financialcryptography.com/
01:47 pm http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001612.html
comments (0) https://financialcryptography.com/cgi-bin/mt/mt-comments.cgi?entry_id=1612
in the age when security services might detain you https://blog.trezor.io/hide-your-trezor-wallets-with-multiple-passphrases-f2e0834026eb
how to hide personal data from a device search https://blog.trezor.io/hide-your-trezor-wallets-with-multiple-passphrases-f2e0834026eb
01:35 pm http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001611.html
comments (1) https://financialcryptography.com/cgi-bin/mt/mt-comments.cgi?entry_id=1611
sha1 collision attack - finally after twelve years http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001612.html
n reasons why searching electronic devices makes everyone unsafe. http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001611.html
smart contracts and smart questions - does a submarine have a blowhole? http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001608.html
fake us embassy provides full service http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001607.html
corda day - a new force http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001606.html
electronic signatures in law - for free! http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001602.html
senegal to use ecurrencymint for digital cash http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001604.html
monetising the dispute http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001600.html
bitfinex - wolves and a sheep voting on what's for dinner http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001599.html
cfp fc 2017 - 3-7 april 2017 malta http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001598.html
corda: an introduction (paper) http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001597.html
ricardian contracts in the media! http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001596.html
ip concerns over ricardian contracts http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001595.html
ethereum is one step away from creating a workable smart contracting community http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001594.html
where is the contract? - a short history of the contract in financial cryptography systems http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001562.html
satoshi is dead - long live satoshi - team leader comes out http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001593.html
ooda loop of breach patching - adobe http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001591.html
elinor ostrom's 8 principles for managing a commmons http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001590.html
fc2016 barbados http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001588.html
the satoshi effect - bitcoin paper success against the academic review system http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001587.html
mark miller http://www.caplet.com/
philipp g?hring http://www2.futureware.at/
ian grigg http://iang.org/papers/
buy a mac http://www.apple.com/
$499 http://www.apple.com/mac-mini/
$899 defeats keyloggers http://www.apple.com/macbook-air/
enhyper http://www.enhyper.com/mt/enhyper/
blogshares http://blogshares.com/?referer=25019
stakeout http://stakeventures.com/
epointsystem http://www.epointsystem.org/
blog https://www.epointsystem.org/trac/website/blog
bob's gold price http://goldprice.org/bob/
linkdump http://linkdumponpayments.blogspot.com/
beyond money (tom greco) http://http://beyondmoney.net/
digital money (dave birch) http://digitaldebateblogs.typepad.com/digital_money/
perilocity http://riskman.typepad.com/perilocity/
icann watch http://www.icannwatch.org/
discourse http://www.discourse.net/
e-signatures http://www.stephenmason.eu/e-signatures/
e-evidence http://www.stephenmason.eu/e-evidence/
what is a transaction? http://linas.org/mirrors/www.gldialtone.com/2001.07.14/transaction01.htm
the shared transaction repository http://linas.org/mirrors/www.gldialtone.com/2001.07.14/str.htm
triple entry accounting http://iang.org/papers/triple_entry.html
erights http://www.erights.org/
ricardian contracts http://iang.org/papers/ricardian_contract.html
wikipedia on the riccy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ricardian_contract
assurance https://www.cacert.org/policy/assurancepolicy.html
dispute https://www.cacert.org/policy/disputeresolutionpolicy.html
digital identity forum http://digitaldebateblogs.typepad.com/
pelle talk http://stakeventures.com/
jabber http://www.saint-andre.com/blog/
webfunds http://www.webfunds.org/
gunnar peterson http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/
refs on security http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/index.html
fc knowledgebase http://www.enhyper.com/lib/financial_cryptography/
weis http://infosecon.net/index.php
digital money http://www.digitalmoneyforum.com/
identity and privacy http://www.identityandprivacy.com/
iacr calendar http://www.iacr.org/events/
emergent chaos http://www.emergentchaos.com/
tao of security http://taosecurity.blogspot.com/
not bad for a cubicle http://thurston.halfcat.org/blog/
cacert http://www.cacert.org/
usable security http://usablesecurity.com/
1 raindrop http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/
econ & sec http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/econsec.html
econ in 1 lesson http://jim.com/econ/contents.html
mises http://blog.mises.org/blog/
hayek http://www.hayekcenter.org/
unenumerated http://unenumerated.blogspot.com/
biblio http://infosecon.net/workshop/bibliography.php
dave birch http://digitaldebateblogs.typepad.com/digital_money/
todd boyle http://rosehill.net/
martin hasan bramwell http://hasanbramwell.blogspot.com/
graeme burnett http://www.enhyper.net/
james donald http://jim.com/
bob hettinga http://www.shipwright.com/
iang http://iang.org/
simon lelieveldt http://www.simonl.org/
stephen mason http://www.stephenmason.eu/
mark miller http://www.caplet.com/
dani nagy http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/homepage
satoshi nakamoto http://www.bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
chris odom https://github.com/fellowtraveler/open-transactions/wiki
frank trotter http://www.everbank.com/004executives.aspx
pelle http://stakeventures.com/
twan van der schoot http://www.twan.com/
nick szabo http://szabo.best.vwh.net/
anne & lynn wheeler http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/index.html
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financial cryptography where the crypto rubber meets the road of finance... february 23, 2017 sha1 collision attack - finally after twelve years timeline on a hash collision attack: 1993 sha0 published 1995 sha1 published due to weaknesses found 2001 sha2 published due to expectations of weakness in sha1 2005 shandong team md5 attacked, sha1 worried 2009? rocketssl breached for using md5 2014 chrome responds and starts phasing out sha1 2017 cwi & google announce collision attack on sha1 the point i wish to make here is that sha1 was effectively deprecated in 2001 with the publication of sha2. if you are vulnerable to a collision attack, then you had your moment of warning sixteen years ago. on the other hand, think about this for a moment - in 2005 the shandong shot was heard around the cryptographic world. everyone knew! but we now see that sha1 lasted an additional 12 years before it crumbled to a collision attack. that shows outstanding strength, an incredible run. on the third hand, let's consider your protocol. if your protocol is /not/ vulnerable to a collision attack then sha1 is still good. as is sha0 and md5. and, as an aside, no protocol should be vulnerable to a collision attack - such weakness is probably a bug. so sha1 is technically only a problem if you have another weakness in your protocol. and if you have that weakness, well, it's a pretty big one, and you should be worried for everything, not just sha1. on the fourth hand, however, institutions are too scared to understand the difference, and too bureaucratic to suggest better practices like eliminating collision vulnerabilities. hence, all software suppliers have been working to deprecate sha1 from consideration. to show you how asinine this gets, some software suppliers are removing older hash functions so, presumably you can't use them - to either make new ones or check old ones. (doh!) security moves as a herd not as a science. staying within the herd provides sociability in numbers, but social happiness shouldn't be mistaken for security, as the turkey well knows. finally, on the fifth hand, i still use sha1 in ricardo for naming ricardian contracts. try for the life of me, and i still can't see how to attack it with collisions. as, after all, the issuer signs his own contract, and if he collides, he's up for both contracts, and there are copies of both distributed... there is no cause for panic, if you've done your homework. posted by iang at 01:47 pm | comments (0) february 19, 2017 n reasons why searching electronic devices makes everyone unsafe. the current practice of searching electronic devices makes everyone less safe. here's several reasons. 1. people's devices will often include their login parameters to online banking or digital cash accounts such as bitcoin. the presence of all this juicy bank account and digital cash information is going to corrupt the people doing the searching work, turning them to seizure. in the age when security services might detain you until you decrypt your hard drive, or border guards might threaten to deny you entry until you reveal your phone?s pin, it is only a matter of time before the state authorities discover what bitcoin hardware wallets are (maybe they did already). when they do, what can stop them from forcing you to unlock and reveal your wallet? i'm not saying may, i'm saying will. and before you say "oh, but our staff are honest and resistant to corruption," let me say this: you're probably wrong and you just don't know it. most countries, including the ones currently experimenting with searching techniques, have corruption in them, the only thing that varies is the degree and location. as we know from the war on drugs, the corruption is pretty much aligned positively with the value that is at risk. as border guards start delving into traveller's electronic devices in the constitution-free zone of the border, they're opened up the traveller's material and disposable wealth. this isn't going to end well. 2. as a response to corruption and/or perceived corruption from the ability for authorities and persons to now see and seize these funds, users or travellers will move away from the safer electronic funding systems to less safe alternates. in the extreme, cash but also consider this a clear signal to use bitcoin, folks. people used to dealing with online methods of storing value will explore alternates. no matter what we think about banks, they are mostly safer than alternates, at least in the oecd, so this will reduce overall safety. 3. anyone who actually intends to harm your homeland already knows what you are up to. so, they'll just avoid it. the easy way is to not carry any electronic devices across the border. they'll pick up new devices as they're driving off from the airport. 4. boom - the entire technique of searching electronic devices is now spent on generating false positives, which are positive hits on the electronic devices of innocent travellers who want to travel not hurt. which all brings harm to everyone except the bad guys who will be left free because there is nothing to search. 5. this is the slight flaw in my argument that everyone will be less safe: the terrorists will be safer, because they won't be being searched. but, as they intend to harm, their level of safety is very low in the long run. 6. which will lead to border guards accusing travellers without electronics of being suspicious jihadists. which will lead real jihadists to start carrying burner phones pre-loaded with 'legends' being personas created for the purpose of tricking border guards. and, yes, before you ask: it's easier for bad folk to create a convincing legend than it is to spot a legend in the crush of the airport queue. 7. the security industry is already - after only 2 weeks of this crazy policy - talking about how to hide personal data from a device search. some of these techniques of hiding the true worth will work. ok, that's the individual's right. 8. note how you've made the security industry your enemy. i'm not sure how this works to the benefit of anyone, but it is going to make it harder for you to get quality advice in the future. 9. some of the techniques won't work, leading to discovery, and a presumption that a traveller has something to hide. therefore /guilty by privacy/ will be branded on innocent people, resulting in more cost to everyone. 10. all of the techniques will lead to an arms race as border guards have to develop newer and better understanding of each dark space in each electronic device, and we the people will have to hunt around for easy dark spaces. when we could all be doing something useful. 11. all of the techniques, working or not, will lower usability and therefore result in less overall security to the user. this is called kerchkhoffs' 6th principle of security: if the device is too hard to use, it won't be used at all, achieving zero security. the notion that searching electronic devices could make anyone safer is based on the likelihood of a freak of accident. that is, the chance that some idiotterrorjihadist doesn't follow the instructions from on-high, and actually carries a device on a plane with some real intel on it. this is a forgettable chance. someone who is so dumb as to fly on a plane, carrying the plans to blow up the airport on his phone, is unlikely to get out of the bath without slipping and breaking his neck. this is not a suitable operative to deal with the intricacies of some evil plot. terrorists will know this; they're evil but they are not stupid. they will not let someone so stupid as to carry infringing material onto the plane. there is zero upside in this tactic. the homeland security people who have been searching electronic devices have summarily destroyed a valuable targetted technique. they have increased harm and damages to everyone, except the people who they think they are chasing, which of course increases the harm to everyone. posted by iang at 01:35 pm | comments (1) recent entries sha1 collision attack - finally after twelve years n reasons why searching electronic devices makes everyone unsafe. smart contracts and smart questions - does a submarine have a blowhole? fake us embassy provides full service corda day - a new force electronic signatures in law - for free! senegal to use ecurrencymint for digital cash monetising the dispute bitfinex - wolves and a sheep voting on what's for dinner cfp fc 2017 - 3-7 april 2017 malta corda: an introduction (paper) ricardian contracts in the media! ip concerns over ricardian contracts ethereum is one step away from creating a workable smart contracting community where is the contract? - a short history of the contract in financial cryptography systems satoshi is dead - long live satoshi - team leader comes out ooda loop of breach patching - adobe elinor ostrom's 8 principles for managing a commmons fc2016 barbados the satoshi effect - bitcoin paper success against the academic review system fc++ #3 mark miller robust composition: towards a unified approach to access control and concurrency control software engineering, rights philipp g?hring concepts against man-in-the-browser attacks software engineering risk (security) threats ian grigg the market for silver bullets economics risk (security) fc++: #1, #2 #3 search search this site: --> security top tips 1. buy a mac $499 ... and $899 defeats keyloggers 2. use another browser bank on one browser, browse on another. 3. write passwords down in a safe place... (use common sense) now updated for apbts (advanced persistent browsing threats :) 7-layers 7 finance enhyper .. blogshares .. stakeout .. fc on finance .. 6 value epointsystem and blog .. bob's gold price .. linkdump .. beyond money (tom greco) .. digital money (dave birch) .. fc on value .. 5 governance perilocity .. icann watch .. discourse .. mason on e-signatures and e-evidence .. fc on governance .. on digital signing .. dispute resolution and negotiation 4 accounting ledgerism - the origin of triple entry: what is a transaction? .. and the shared transaction repository. sounds familiar? triple entry accounting .. fc on accounting 3 rights erights .. the ricardian contracts & wikipedia on the riccy .. cacert's assurance and dispute .. digital identity forum .. fc on rights .. on identity .. and identity cost .. 2 software engineering pelle talk .. jabber .. webfunds .. gunnar peterson .. fc on softeng .. 1 crypto fc on crypto .. categories meta refs on security .. fc knowledgebase .. fc meta .. fc teams&hr .. fc pennies conf & pubs weis .. dave birch's digital money and identity and privacy .. iacr calendar .. fc conferences .. risks & sec (adam, arthur, chris, mordaxus) emergent chaos .. adi shamir's 3 laws .. kerckhoffs' 6 principles .. tao of security .. not bad for a cubicle .. cacert .. ping's usable security .. gunnar peterson's 1 raindrop .. fc cost of identity .. fc risks&sec .. fc threats econ anderson's econ & sec .. econ in 1 lesson, mises, hayek .. unenumerated nick on law .. weis biblio .. fc econ .. fc stats the registry of transcendent financial cryptogrophers dave birch .. todd boyle .. martin hasan bramwell .. stefan brands .. graeme burnett .. james donald .. amir herzberg .. bob hettinga .. iang .. simon lelieveldt .. stephen mason .. mark miller .. dani nagy .. satoshi nakamoto .. james nesfield .. chris odom .. frank trotter .. pelle .. twan van der schoot .. nick szabo .. anne & lynn wheeler .. rachel willmer .. zooko .. syndicate this site (xml) this weblog is licensed under a creative commons license. powered by movable type 2.64 |sonance|network|


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